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Abstract
People seem more divided than ever before over social and political issues, 
entrenched in their existing beliefs and unwilling to change them. Empirical research 
on mechanisms driving this resistance to belief change has focused on a limited set 
of well-known, charged, contentious issues and has not accounted for deliberation 
over reasons and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. With 
a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3001), we attempt to overcome these existing 
problems, and we investigate the causes and consequences of resistance to belief 
change for five diverse and less contentious socio-political issues. After participants 
chose initially to support or oppose a given socio-political position, they were pro-
vided with reasons favoring their chosen position (affirming reasons), reasons favor-
ing the other, unchosen position (conflicting reasons), or all reasons for both posi-
tions (reasons for both sides). Our results indicate that participants are more likely 
to stick with their initial decisions than to change them no matter which reasons are 
considered, and that this resistance to belief change is likely due to a motivated, 
biased evaluation of the reasons to support their initial beliefs (prior-belief bias). 
More specifically, they rated affirming reasons more favorably than conflicting 
reasons—even after accounting for reported prior knowledge about the issue, the 
novelty of the reasons presented, and the reported strategy used to make the initial 
decision. In many cases, participants who did not change their positions tended to 
become more confident in the superiority of their positions after considering many 
reasons for both sides.
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Introduction
Although many philosophers and psychologists have argued that it is normatively 
desirable to engage in even-handed, conscientious deliberation over reasons and 
arguments to form and revise beliefs (Dewey 1927; Mill 1859; Mullinix 2016), 
people seem decidedly entrenched in their social and political positions, unwilling 
to change them even in the face of compelling reasons and arguments for alterna-
tive positions (Lodge and Taber 2013; Strickland et  al. 2011). Several distinct 
mechanisms have been posited to explain why people are so resistant to chang-
ing their beliefs about social and political issues (Lodge and Taber 2013; Taber 
and Lodge 2006). However, previous work focuses on a small set of well-known, 
contentious issues and does not account for deliberation prior to experimental 
sessions. These problems have impeded progress in understanding whether and 
to what extent these mechanisms are responsible for resistance to belief change. 
Here, we attempt to account for these problems, and we investigate the role of a 
fundamental mechanism—the prior-belief bias (i.e., judging reasons, arguments, 
and evidence favoring one’s beliefs as better than reasons, arguments, and evi-
dence incongruent with one’s beliefs)—in accounting for why people might be 
resistant to changing their beliefs for a diverse set of social and political issues. 
In short, we find that, even for less contentious, charged, well-known issues, 
relatively few participants who deliberate over reasons change their minds. Our 
results suggest that this resistance to position change is likely due to a motivated, 
biased evaluation of the reasons to support their initial decisions (i.e., a prior-
belief bias). This motivated, biased evaluation of reasons continues to explain 
resistance to belief change even after accounting for reported prior knowledge 
about the issues, the novelty of the reasons evaluated, and participants’ reported 
strategies in making their initial decisions. Ultimately, those who do not change 
their positions tend to become more confident in the superiority of their posi-
tions, even after examining a balanced set of reasons for both sides of an issue.
When people are deliberating about socio-political issues, two dissociable 
goals broadly motivate their reasoning (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Kunda 1990). 
On one hand, accuracy goals motivate people to seek out and evenhandedly con-
sider relevant evidence to reach the correct or optimal conclusion (Baumeister 
and Newman 1994; Fiske and Taylor 1991). Pursuing accuracy goals tends 
to lead to strategies where people invest cognitive effort into carefully assess-
ing the relevant information, setting aside beliefs that could bias their evaluation 
(Kruglanski and Freund 1983; Kunda 1990). On the other hand, directional goals 
motivate people to seek out and to evaluate evidence in order to support existing 
beliefs and perspectives (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Kunda 1990). Because 
the aim of directional reasoning is the justification and validation of existing or 
desired beliefs, people operating with directional goals often dismiss or misinter-
pret relevant information that is incongruent with those existing or desired beliefs 
(Druckman and Bolsen 2011; Kunda 1990; Lodge and Taber 2013).
Are people more likely to pursue accuracy or directional goals when deliberat-
ing about socio-political issues? Some evidence suggests that people attempt to 
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be fair-minded when considering reasons and arguments; they at least try to pre-
serve the “illusion of objectivity” (Pyszczynski and Greenberg 1987). Critically, 
people can be consistently and reliably persuaded to change their beliefs—even 
their beliefs about socio-political issues (Aldrich et  al. 1989; Prior et  al. 2014; 
Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989; Wood and Porter 2018)—by strong, credible 
reasons and arguments (Petty et al. 1997). These findings suggest that people do 
pursue accuracy goals when deliberating about socio-political issues under cer-
tain circumstances.
Nevertheless, acquiring and maintaining socio-political beliefs also involves 
directional goals. For example, to defend their partisan identities, people seek out 
and favorably evaluate information that supports their party’s positions, while coun-
ter-arguing, denigrating, and rejecting information that conflicts with their party’s 
positions (i.e., partisan motivated reasoning; Bolsen et al. 2014; Cohen, 2003; Ditto 
et al. 2017; Mullinix 2016; Petersen et al. 2013). A Democrat operating under direc-
tional goals might seek out and readily accept evidence that supports a position 
favored by Democrats and opposed by Republicans; but if that same position had 
been favored by Republicans and opposed by Democrats, a Democrat might ignore, 
dismiss, and denigrate that same evidence. Encountering reasons and arguments 
contrary to their beliefs might even induce people with directional goals to become 
more strongly entrenched in their existing views (Berinsky 2017; Redlawsk 2002; 
Lewandowsky et al. 2012; Nyhan et al. 2014; Nyhan and Reifler 2015; although, see 
Wood and Porter 2018). In a particularly powerful study, Nyhan and Reifler (2010) 
found that when challenged with information debunking the presence of weapons 
of mass destruction in Iraq, participants rarely changed their beliefs and tended to 
become more certain about the veracity of their pre-existing views. Similarly, cor-
recting false beliefs about the supposed link between vaccines and autism can make 
people less likely to intend to vaccinate their children (Nyhan et  al. 2014; Nyhan 
and Reifler, 2015). Fully debunked political myths (e.g., that Barack Obama was 
born outside the United States) continue to be accepted as true in the face of clear, 
countervailing evidence (Flynn et al. 2017; Lewandowsky et al. 2012; although, see 
Wood and Porter 2018). In this way, attempts to change beliefs by presenting coun-
tervailing reasons and arguments has the potential to further entrench people in their 
existing beliefs.
Here, we investigate the likelihood that people change their positions about 
specific socio-political issues after considering many different reasons meant to 
strengthen or challenge their previously-endorsed positions, and we investigate 
whether a prior-belief bias underlies resistance to position change. Widely-cited 
empirical evidence for the prior-belief bias for socio-political issues comes from 
Taber and Lodge (2006; although see Lord et al. (1979) for a conceptual and meth-
odological predecessor). In this research, college students were recruited to take 
part in a study focusing on two contentious, charged, well-known issues: affirmative 
action and gun control. Participants first reported their attitudes about these issues. 
They then considered several reasons affirming and conflicting with their attitudes, 
and then they reported their attitudes again. Participants evaluated arguments that 
were consistent with their prior attitudes as stronger and more compelling than argu-
ments incongruent with their prior attitudes. Additionally, existing general political 
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knowledge and prior attitude strength moderated the degree to which individuals 
engaged in motivated reasoning such that participants who were more knowledge 
about and invested in a topic were more likely to engage in biased, directional 
reasoning. After evaluating arguments, participants’ attitudes became even more 
extreme in the direction of their priors, indicating a polarization effect. Taber and 
Lodge (2006) conclude that “people are often unable to escape the pull of their prior 
attitudes and beliefs, which guide the processing of new information in predictable 
and sometimes insidious ways” (p. 767).
A notable problem with extant investigations into the prior-belief bias is that 
they have utilized a small number of issues that tend to be particularly well-known, 
contentious, emotionally-charged, and morally-laden (e.g., the death penalty or gun 
control). On these particular issues, individuals are likely to already hold strong 
beliefs, and they may feel particularly comfortable clinging to polarized positions 
given well-known partisan divisions (Druckman 2012). So, the social and political 
issues that have been used to investigate the prior-belief bias seem especially prone 
to stimulate directional biases. While people might be more likely to pursue direc-
tional goals in evaluating arguments for these few issues, it is plausible that they 
pursue accuracy goals for most other issues, especially when they have had minimal 
prior exposure to them.
A related problem with existing investigations into the prior-belief bias is 
accounting for participants’ experiences before the experimental session. Experi-
ments investigating a possible prior-belief bias for social and political issues (e.g., 
Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009) have utilized issues, reasons, and argu-
ments that frequently appear in literature, radio talk shows, news media, social 
media, blogs, etc. Participants generally reported being knowledgeable about the 
issues, and their responses in these experiments were likely influenced by prior 
exposure to reasons and arguments. For example, periods of rational deliberation 
over certain reasons and arguments could have produced the belief that death pen-
alty is a useful deterrent prior to the experimental session. If this occurred, then, 
after reporting their beliefs in the experimental session, participants might be 
exposed to many of the same reasons and arguments over which they had already 
deliberated. If participants do, in fact, rate the quality of those reasons favoring their 
own position about the death penalty as better than those favoring the other available 
position, experimenters would mistakenly characterize this pattern of responses as 
a biased, motivated evaluation of new reasons that bolster support for previously-
made choices in a post hoc fashion. But these reasons and arguments would not be 
new to participants, and the actual behavior would be far from irrational. Given that 
those participants more knowledgeable about politics are more likely to succumb 
to the prior-belief bias, according to Taber and Lodge (2006), it is likely that such 
participants were equipped with the requisite knowledge to reason to an informed 
position about gun control or affirmative action on some occasion before the experi-
mental session. This confound might be especially pronounced in experiments that 
have recruited participants disproportionately likely to possess existing knowledge 
about these issues (e.g., college students in political science courses, as is the case in 
Taber and Lodge (2006) and in a follow-up study conducted by Taber et al. (2009)). 
Because of this prior contamination problem, it is unclear whether and to what 
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extent people do engage in biased, motivated reasoning to support their pre-existing 
beliefs about socio-political issues when exposed to new, relevant information.1
In our study, we recruited a large, heterogeneous sample (N = 3001) to investi-
gate causes (prior-belief bias) and consequences (polarization effect) of resistance 
to position change using diverse socio-political issues—domestic fracking, animal 
testing for scientific purposes, drone strikes on military targets overseas, the gold 
standard, and standardized testing in schools—all while attempting to account for 
these problems inherent in prior studies. Although these socio-political issues are 
topically relevant, they are not constantly in the news and many citizens may have 
unsettled opinions about them. As such, these issues may be less likely to stimulate 
directional biases.
As such, we investigate three specific inter-related questions. First, how likely are 
people to change their positions about socio-political issues after evaluating differ-
ent sets of reasons? After choosing initially to support or oppose a presented posi-
tion, participants evaluate reasons favoring their chosen positions (affirming rea-
sons), reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions (conflicting reasons), or all 
reasons for both possible positions (reasons for both sides). After evaluating reasons, 
participants are given the opportunity to change their positions. Because the socio-
political issues under investigation are not as charged, contentious, or well-known 
as the issues employed in other investigations into the prior-belief bias, we expect 
participants to be more likely to respond to reasons. Those who evaluate conflicting 
reasons only should be significantly more likely to change their positions than those 
who evaluate reasons for both sides, and those who evaluate reasons for both sides 
should, in turn, be significantly more likely to change their positions than those who 
evaluates affirming reasons only. No matter which reasons are evaluated, however, 
we expect that a greater proportion of participants will stick with their initial posi-
tions than change their minds.
Second, for those who do not change their positions—regardless of the reasons 
evaluated—we investigate whether this resistance is explained by a biased evalua-
tion of the available reasons in a way that serves to favor their initial judgments. To 
comprehensively account for the possible influence of reasoning and deliberation 
occurring before initially choosing a position, participants (1) reported their overall 
prior knowledge about the issue, (2) indicated which reasons they had considered 
before making their initial decisions in the experimental session, and (3) reported 
the strategy they used to make the initial decision. After accounting for the influ-
ence of episodes of reasoning and deliberation occurring before initially choosing a 
position, the magnitude of the prior-belief bias may be reduced or even eliminated. 
This would indicate that people are actually more likely to pursue accuracy goals for 
diverse social and political issues once confounds are removed. On the other hand, 
the pursuit of directional goals might extend to the consideration of these issues 
even after accounting for periods of reasoning and deliberation occurring before the 
initial decision is made to support or oppose the issue.
1 Note that this is also a problem for many investigations into partisan motivated reasoning just as it is 
for investigations into issue motivated reasoning.
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Finally, do those who stick with their initial positions after evaluating reasons 
become more confident in the superiority of their positions after considering rea-
sons? If participants engage in a biased, motivated evaluation of reasons in favor of 
their initial chosen positions, they might become more entrenched in their positions 
even after evaluating a balanced set of reasons for both sides (i.e., a polarization 
effect). Numerous attempts to find polarization effects for social and political issues 
in controlled, experimental settings have failed (Kuhn and Lao 1996; Miller et al. 
1993; Pomerantz et al. 1995). The common threads among the relatively few studies 
that have successfully identified polarization effects (e.g., Taber et al. 2009; Taber 
and Lodge 2006; Lord et al. 1979) are that they have used contentious, charged, and 
morally-laden socio-political issues (e.g., the death penalty, gun control, or affirm-
ative action). The prior-belief bias plays a role in driving polarization effects for 
this small set of previously-examined issues, but it is unclear whether polarization 
effects generalize across a broader range of social and political issues. When the 
issues under consideration are less charged, contentious, and well-known, people 
may not become more confident in the superiority of their beliefs. Moreover, if par-
ticipants do not engage in a biased, motivated evaluation of the reasons to favor their 
initial chosen positions, then it is unclear what would drive polarization effects. The 
many reasons and arguments provided on both sides of the issues might even induce 
uncertainty about which position is better, thereby reducing confidence that the cho-
sen position is superior.
Materials and Methods
Participants
3030 individuals voluntarily participated in this study via Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (AMT) for monetary compensation.2 Informed consent was obtained from all 
individual participants included in the study. Although samples collected via AMT 
should not be considered representative of the United States population, they outper-
form in-lab convenience samples in ensuring adequate variation across socio-eco-
nomic and political characteristics of interest (Berinsky et al. 2012; Mullinix et al. 
2015). 29 participants failed to answer at least one question, so data were analyzed 
with the remaining 3001 individuals (Mage = 36.67, SD = 11.45,  rangeage = [18–90], 
1407 females, 1571 males).3
Materials and Procedure
Five different socio-political issues were used in this study: fracking, animal test-
ing, drone strikes, the gold standard, and standardized testing (see Online Appendix 
2 Participant recruitment was restricted to individuals in the United States with a prior approval rating 
above 80% on AMT.
3 This study was approved by the Duke University Campus Institutional Review Board.
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A for exact materials presented). The set of reasons was obtained directly from 
political interest groups and popular websites (e.g., procon.org), closely following 
the strategy implemented by Taber and Lodge (2006). The procedure is depicted 
in Fig.  1, and it closely resembles the procedure used in Stanley et  al. (2018) to 
investigate motivated reasoning about moral dilemmas. The entire study was self-
paced. Participants were instructed to carefully read neutral, descriptive, background 
information about one of five randomly selected socio-political issues. For exam-
ple, participants in the fracking condition read one short paragraph explaining that 
fracking is a process by which natural gas is extracted from the Earth. Immediately 
after reading this background information, participants were asked about their prior 
knowledge regarding the issue to which they were assigned. For example, partici-
pants answered the following question for fracking: “Prior to reading the descrip-
tive information about fracking above, how much did you personally know about 
fracking?” (1  =  nothing at all, 9  =  very much). Participants were then instructed 
to make an initial choice to either support or oppose the stated position. For exam-
ple, in the fracking condition, participants could choose between the following: (1) 
I support the position that fracking for natural gas should be permitted in the United 
States, or (2) I oppose the position that fracking for natural gas should be permitted 
in the United States. Then, they provided a judgment about their confidence in the 
superiority of their initial chosen position (1 = not at all confident; 9 = very confi-
dent). Participants were then instructed to indicate how they made their decision: (1) 
an immediate reaction or feeling after reading about the issue such that no reasons 
affected the decision, (2) at least one reason, or (3) some other strategy.
Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three between-subjects condi-
tions: only affirming reasons were evaluated, only conflicting reasons were evalu-
ated, or all reasons for both options were evaluated. For each socio-political issue, 
we used eight affirming reasons and eight conflicting reasons. The order in which 
the reasons were presented was randomized (although participants who evaluated 
reasons for both sides saw blocks of affirming and conflicting reasons, respectively). 
Participants were asked to rate how compelling each reason was for choosing that 
particular position on a scale from 1 (worst possible reason) to 9 (best possible rea-
son). After providing a rating for the quality of given a reason, participants made a 
judgment (yes or no) on the same page about the novelty of the reason by answering 
the following question: “Had you considered the reason above before seeing it just 
Fig. 1  Schematic of the experimental paradigm
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now?” After providing ratings for reasons, participants were asked to choose again 
their preferred option (i.e., to support or oppose the presented position). At this 
stage, participants had the opportunity to change their minds. They then provided a 
judgment about how confident they were that this final selected position is the supe-
rior position (1 = not at all confident; 9 = very confident). Finally, participants were 
asked if they considered any additional reasons not presented in the study. If partici-
pants considered other reasons, they were instructed to describe those additional rea-
sons. Upon completion, participants were monetarily compensated for their time.4
Results
Table 1 shows the percentage of participants indicating they would make each pos-
sible choice for each socio-political position as a function of the set of reasons pre-
sented and when the decision was made (i.e., the initial decision before seeing rea-
sons or the final decision after seeing reasons). Descriptive statistics are provided 
for reported prior knowledge about each issue (Online Appendix B) and the number 
of novel reasons evaluated for each issue (Online Appendix C). Figure  2 depicts 
the percentages of participants who changed their positions for each socio-political 
Table 1  Percentage of participants choosing to support or to oppose the presented positions are depicted 
before (Initial) and after (Final) evaluating reasons for each socio-political issue and condition (i.e., 
affirming reasons only, conflicting reasons only, or reasons for both sides)
Issue Affirming reasons (%) Conflicting reasons 
(%)
Reasons for both 
sides (%)
Initial Final Initial Final Initial Final
Fracking (n = 590)
 Support 34.7 33.7 32.7 34.2 30.2 29.2
 Oppose 65.3 66.3 67.3 65.8 69.8 70.8
Animal testing (n = 592)
 Support 71.2 69.7 63.8 59.6 62.6 64.3
 Oppose 28.8 30.3 36.2 40.4 37.4 35.7
Drone strikes (n = 608)
 Support 74.4 74.4 72.4 72.9 74.3 72.8
 Oppose 25.6 25.6 27.6 27.1 25.7 27.2
Gold standard (n = 607)
 Support 54.0 53.5 50.7 41.4 51.5 44.6
 Oppose 46.0 46.5 49.3 58.6 48.5 55.4
Standardized testing (n = 604)
 Support 44.8 45.3 49.7 45.1 47.6 46.7
 Oppose 55.2 54.7 50.3 54.9 52.4 53.3
4 All data and materials are available at https ://osf.io/dxt8q /.
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issue as a function of the reasons evaluated. Furthermore, because a small propor-
tion of participants who evaluated reasons for both sides considered additional rea-
sons above and beyond the reasons we presented (fewer than 10 % of participants on 
average across the five socio-political issues), this suggests that our set of reasons is 
relatively exhaustive.
The Effect of Reasons on Position Change
First, using two-sided Fisher’s Exact Tests (FET) in conjunction with Goodman and 
Kruskal τ, we investigated whether and to what extent participants were more likely 
to change their initial positions after considering affirming reasons, conflicting rea-
sons, or reasons for both sides. In other words, we sought to determine how likely 
participants were to change their minds after evaluating different sets of reasons. 
Evaluating each socio-political issue separately, there were statistically significant 
relationships between whether or not participants changed their decisions and the 
particular set of reasons evaluated for fracking (FET: p < 0.001; τ  =  0.079), ani-
mal testing (FET: p = 0.002; τ = 0.019), drone strikes (FET: p < 0.001; τ = 0.030), 
the gold standard (FET: p < 0.001; τ  =  0.136), and standardized testing (FET: 
p = 0.001; τ = 0.023). Employing ransacking (Goodman 1969), we next compared 
the likelihood of position change between all possible pairs of conditions (i.e., (1) 
conflicting only relative to affirming only, (2) conflicting only relative to reasons for 
both sides, and (3) reasons for both sides relative to affirming only). Full results for 
each socio-political issue are presented in Table 2. For all five socio-political issues, 
participants who evaluated conflicting reasons only were significantly more likely 
to change their initial positions than participants who evaluated affirming reasons 
only. Moreover, for all socio-political issues except for animal testing, participants 
who evaluated conflicting reasons only were significantly more likely to change their 
initial decisions than participants who evaluated reasons for both sides. Finally, for 
all socio-political issues except for standardized testing, participants who evaluated 
Fig. 2  Percentages of participants changing their decisions for each socio-political issue as a function of 
the particular reasons evaluated (i.e., affirming reasons only, conflicting reasons only, or reasons for both 
sides)
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reasons for both sides were significantly more likely to change their initial positions 
than participants who evaluated affirming reasons only.
Overall, those who evaluated conflicting reasons only were generally more likely 
to change their positions than those who evaluated reasons for both sides, and those 
who evaluated reasons for both sides were, in turn, generally more likely to change 
their positions than those who evaluated affirming reasons only. However, these 
effects were consistently small in magnitude for all issues other than the gold stand-
ard (see Table  2; Fig.  2). For all five issues, no matter which set of reasons was 
evaluated, participants were more likely to stick with their initial decisions than to 
change them.
Biased, Motivated Evaluation of Arguments
Having found that participants are more likely to stick with their initial decisions 
than to change them for all five issues, we next investigated whether this resistance 
to position change is likely attributable to a biased, motivated evaluation of the pro-
vided reasons. That is, we offer a potential explanation for why so many participants 
were unwilling to change their minds in the face of reasons. To this end, for partici-
pants who considered all reasons for both sides, we first investigated whether, rela-
tive to participants who changed their minds, participants who did not change their 
minds were more likely to evaluate reasons favoring their initial decisions as bet-
ter than those reasons favoring the other, unchosen position. A linear mixed-effects 
model was computed with issue included as a random effect (random intercepts 
only) and with the initial decision (‘support’ coded as 1 versus ‘oppose’ coded as 
0) and whether participants changed their minds (‘yes’ coded as 1 versus ‘no’ coded 
as 0) included as binary fixed-factors. The outcome variable was computed by first 
averaging the rated quality of reasons for each possible position separately and then 
by taking the difference in average ratings for one option relative to the other option 
(average rating for reasons to choose ‘support’ minus average rating for reasons to 
choose ‘oppose’). There was as significant effect of the initial decision (b = 3.60, 
SE = 0.13, t = 28.28, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [3.36, 3.86]), a significant effect of whether 
participants changed their minds (b = 2.26, SE = 0.34, t = 6.63, p < 0.001, 95 % CI 
[1.55, 2.94]), and a significant interaction effect (b = − 3.24, SE = 0.43, t = − 7.49, 
p < 0.001, 95 % CI [− 4.12, − 2.34]). The significant interaction effect suggests that, 
relative to participants who changed their minds, participants who did not change 
their minds exhibited a stronger propensity to evaluate reasons favoring their initial 
decisions as better than those reasons favoring the other, unchosen position.
To further interrogate this interaction effect, we computed two additional linear 
mixed-effects models. We first investigated whether those participants who did not 
change their positions evaluated reasons favoring their initial chosen positions as 
better than those reasons favoring the other, unchosen position. A linear mixed-
effects model was computed with issue included as a random effect (random inter-
cepts only) and with the initial decision (‘support’ coded as 1 versus ‘oppose’ coded 
as 0) included as a binary fixed-factor. As before, the outcome variable was the aver-
age rating for reasons to choose ‘support’ minus average rating for reasons to choose 
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‘oppose’. Overall, participants rated those reasons favoring their initial chosen posi-
tions as better than those reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions (n = 915, 
b = 3.58, SE = 0.13, t = 27.92, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [3.33, 3.83]). Separate t-tests for 
each of the five issues revealed that participants rated reasons favoring their initial 
chosen positions as better than reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions (see 
Table 3; Fig. 3). In contrast, another linear mixed-effects model computed only for 
participants who changed their minds revealed no effect of the initial decision on 
the difference in the average rated quality of reasons (n = 85, b = 0.40, SE = 0.40, 
t  =  1.01, p  =  0.314, 95  % CI [− 0.40, 1.23]). Thus, the effect of the initial deci-
sion on reason evaluation is exclusive to those participants who did not change their 
minds.
Next, for participants who evaluated affirming reasons only or opposing reasons 
only, we computed another linear mixed-effects model with issue included as a 
random effect (random intercepts only) and with condition (affirming reasons only 
Table 3  Results of separate 
t-tests indicate that participants 
rated reasons favoring their 
initially chosen positions as 
better than reasons favoring 
the other, unchosen positions 
for participants who evaluated 
reasons for both sides
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95  % CIs are for the mean difference. 
The outcome variable in all statistical tests was the average rated 
quality of reasons to choose ‘support’ minus the average rated qual-
ity of reasons to choose ‘oppose’. Initial decisions to support were 
coded as 1, and initial decisions to oppose were coded as 0. Total 
n = 915
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 176 3.34 0.38 8.76*** [2.59, 4.09]
Animal testing 181 3.45 0.24 14.70*** [2.99, 3.92]
Drone strikes 193 3.47 0.28 12.33*** [2.91, 4.02]
Gold standard 172 2.91 0.27 10.79*** [2.38, 3.44]
Standardized testing 193 4.58 0.26 17.74*** [4.07, 5.09]
Fig. 3  Means and standard error bars represent the differences in the average rated quality of reasons 
between the two possible positions from which to choose (i.e., to support or to oppose) for those partici-
pants who evaluated reasons for both sides and who did not change their positions (n = 915). Difference 
scores were computed for each individual participant by subtracting the average rating of reasons for 
choosing ‘oppose’ from the average rating of reasons for choosing ‘support’
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coded as 1 versus conflicting reasons only coded as 0) and whether the participants 
changed their minds (‘yes’ coded as 1 versus ‘no’ coded as 0) included as binary 
fixed-factors. There was as significant effect of condition (b  =  1.78, SE  =  0.05, 
t = 32.55, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [1.67, 1.88]), a significant effect of whether partici-
pants changed their minds (b = 1.27, SE = 0.09, t = 13.35, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [1.07, 
1.46]), and a significant interaction effect (b = -2.79, SE = 0.27, t = -8.30, p < 0.001, 
95 % CI [− 2.79, − 1.70]). The significant interaction effect suggests that, for partici-
pants who did not change their minds relative to participants who did change their 
minds, participants who evaluated only conflicting reasons rated those reasons less 
favorably than participants who evaluated only affirming reasons.
To further interrogate this interaction effect, we computed two additional linear 
mixed-effects models. In both models, the issue was included as a random effect 
(random intercepts only), and condition (affirming reasons only coded as 1 versus 
conflicting reasons only coded as 0) was included as a binary fixed-factor. First, 
for participants who did not change their minds, those who evaluated only conflict-
ing reasons rated those reasons less favorably than participants who evaluated only 
affirming reasons (n = 1793, b = 1.78, SE = 0.06, t = 32.09, p < 0.001, 95 % CI 
[1.68, 1.89]). Separate t-tests for each of the five issues revealed that participants 
who evaluated only conflicting reasons rated those reasons less favorably than indi-
viduals who evaluated only affirming reasons (see Table  4; Fig. D1). Second, for 
participants who did change their minds, there was no difference in the rated quality 
of the reasons between those assigned to the affirming reasons condition relative to 
those assigned to the conflicting reasons condition (n = 208, b = -0.45, SE = 0.24, 
t = -1.85, p = 0.066, 95 % CI [− 0.91, 0.06]). Thus, the effect of condition (affirm-
ing reasons only versus opposing reasons only) on reason evaluation is exclusive to 
those participants who did not change their minds.
Prior Knowledge and Reason Novelty
Even though our selected issues are not as charged, contentious, or well-known as 
those utilized in previous investigations into the prior-belief bias, rational delib-
eration over many of the same reasons and arguments could still have causally 
Table 4  Results of separate 
t-tests indicate that participants 
who evaluated only conflicting 
reasons rated those reasons less 
favorably than individuals who 
evaluated only affirming reasons 
for each of the five issues
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95  % CIs are for the mean difference. 
The outcome variable in all statistical tests was the average rated 
quality of reasons evaluated. Those assigned to the affirming reasons 
only condition were coded as 1, and those who were assigned to the 
conflicting reasons only condition were coded as 0. Total n = 1793
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 349 2.11 0.13 16.44*** [1.86, 2.36]
Animal testing 369 1.34 0.12 11.40*** [1.11, 1.58]
Drone strikes 383 1.73 0.12 14.93*** [1.50, 1.96]
Gold standard 327 1.50 0.13 11.93*** [1.25, 1.75]
Standardized testing 365 2.20 0.13 16.34*** [1.93, 2.46]
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produced a belief in the superiority of one position over the other position prior 
to making the initial decision to support or oppose in the experimental session. 
To begin to account for this possibility, we first investigated the magnitude of 
the prior-belief bias after statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge 
and the number of novel reasons evaluated for participants who evaluated reasons 
for both sides. A linear mixed-effects model was computed with issue included 
as a random effect (random intercepts only), with the initial decision (‘support’ 
coded as 1 versus ‘oppose’ coded as 0) included as a binary fixed-factor, and with 
reported prior knowledge and the number of novel reasons evaluated included as 
covariates. As before, the outcome variable was computed by taking the average 
rating for reasons to choose ‘support’ minus average rating for reasons to choose 
‘oppose’. Overall, participants rated reasons favoring their initial chosen positions 
as better than reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions, after statistically 
controlling for reported prior knowledge and reason novelty (n = 915, b = 3.12, 
SE = 0.13, t = 23.35, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [2.88, 3.42]). Separate regression mod-
els for each issue revealed that, after statistically controlling for reported prior 
knowledge and reason novelty, participants rated reasons favoring their initial 
chosen positions as better than reasons favoring the unchosen positions for all five 
issues (Table 5).
Another linear mixed-effects model was computed with issue included as a ran-
dom effect (random intercepts only), with condition (affirming reasons only coded as 
1 versus conflicting reasons only coded as 0) included as a binary fixed-factor, and 
with reported prior knowledge and the number of novel reasons evaluated included 
as covariates. Participants who evaluated conflicting reasons only rated those rea-
sons less favorably than participants who evaluated affirming reasons only, after 
statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge and reason novelty (n = 1793, 
b = 1.78, SE = 0.06, t = 31.99, p < 0.001, 95 % CI [1.66, 1.88]). Separate regression 
models for each issue revealed that, after statistically controlling for reported prior 
knowledge and reason novelty, participants who evaluated only conflicting reasons 
Table 5  The effect of the initial decision on the difference in average ratings of reason quality is 
depicted, after statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge and the number of novel reasons 
evaluated
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95  % CIs are for unstandardized beta-values. The outcome variable in all 
statistical tests was the average rated quality of reasons to choose ‘support’ minus the average rated qual-
ity of reasons to choose ‘oppose’. Initial decisions to support were coded as 1, and initial decisions to 
oppose were coded as 0. Total n = 915
Issue n b SE β t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 176 2.51 0.41 0.42 6.15*** [1.70, 3.31]
Animal Testing 181 3.13 0.23 0.67 13.48*** [2.67, 3.59]
Drone Strikes 193 2.77 0.28 0.53 9.96*** [2.22, 3.32]
Gold Standard 172 2.70 0.30 0.59 8.93*** [2.10, 3.30]
Standardized Testing 193 3.99 0.28 0.69 14.49*** [3.44, 4.53]
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rated those reasons less favorably than individuals who evaluated only affirming rea-
sons for all issues (Table 6).5
Reported Decision Strategies
To further address the possibility that unbiased deliberation over reasons causally 
produced the initial decisions to support or oppose the positions, we investigated 
whether people evaluate the reasons favoring their initial chosen positions as bet-
ter than those favoring the other, unchosen positions, even when they report basing 
their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever. If those participants who report that 
reasons did not influence their initial decisions do, in fact, judge reasons favoring 
their initial chosen positions as better than the reasons favoring the other, unchosen 
positions, then this would offer strong evidence for a bias in evaluating reasons.
To address this, we isolated the subset of participants who evaluated reasons 
for both sides and who reported making their initial decisions based on no reasons 
whatsoever (n = 234). With this subset of participants, a linear mixed-effects model 
was computed with issue included as a random effect (random intercepts only) and 
with the initial decision (‘support’ coded as 1 versus ‘oppose’ coded as 0) included 
as a binary fixed-factor. As before, the outcome variable was the average rating for 
reasons to choose ‘support’ minus average rating for reasons to choose ‘oppose’. 
Overall, participants who reported basing their initial decisions on no reasons what-
soever still rated reasons favoring their initial chosen positions as better than reasons 
favoring the other, unchosen positions (b = 2.83, SE = 0.28, t = 10.10, p < 0.001, 
95 % CI [2.34, 3.36]). Separate t-tests revealed that participants who reported basing 
their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever still rated reasons favoring their ini-
tial chosen positions as better than reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions for 
each of the five issues (see Table 7; Fig. 4). Another linear mixed-effects model was 
Table 6  The effect of condition (affirming reasons only versus opposing reasons only) on the average 
rated quality of the reasons is depicted, after statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge and the 
number of novel reasons evaluated
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95 % CIs are for unstandardized beta-values. The outcome variable in all sta-
tistical tests was the average rated quality of reasons presented. Those assigned to the affirming reasons 
only condition were coded as 1, and those who were assigned to the conflicting reasons only condition 
were coded as 0. Total n = 1793
Issue n b SE β t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 349 2.18 0.13 0.68 16.62*** [1.92, 2.44]
Animal Testing 369 1.33 0.12 0.51 11.40*** [1.10, 1.56]
Drone Strikes 383 1.72 0.12 0.61 14.90*** [1.49, 1.94]
Gold Standard 327 1.43 0.12 0.54 11.98*** [1.20, 1.67]
Standardized Testing 365 2.17 0.13 0.65 16.45*** [1.91, 2.43]
5 The same pattern of results was obtained when subject and reason were included as crossed random-
effects in separate linear mixed-effects models for each issue.
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Table 7  For participants who evaluated reasons for both sides and who reported basing their initial deci-
sions on no reasons whatsoever, the results of separate t-tests are depicted indicating that participants 
rated reasons favoring their initial chosen positions as better than reasons favoring the unchosen positions 
for each of the five issues taken separately
*Indicates p < 0.05, **indicates p < 0.01, ***indicates p < 0.001. All 95 % CIs are for the mean differ-
ence. The outcome variable in all statistical tests was the average rated quality of reasons to choose ‘sup-
port’ minus the average rated quality of reasons to choose ‘oppose’. Total n = 234
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 35 1.74 0.84 2.07* [0.01, 3.47]
Animal testing 33 3.78 0.50 7.54*** [2.76, 4.80]
Drone strikes 52 3.35 0.70 4.78*** [1.94, 4.76]
Gold standard 72 1.93 0.42 4.55*** [1.08, 2.78]
Standardized testing 42 4.63 0.59 7.89*** [3.44, 5.81]
Fig. 4  Means and standard error bars represent the differences in the average rated quality of reasons 
between the two possible positions from which to choose (i.e., to support or to oppose) for those partici-
pants who evaluated reasons for both sides, who did not change their positions, and who reported basing 
their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever (n  =  234). Difference scores were computed for each 
individual participant by subtracting the average rating of reasons for choosing ‘oppose’ from the average 
rating of reasons for choosing ‘support’
Table 8  For participants who reported basing their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever, the results 
of separate t-tests indicate that participants who evaluated only conflicting reasons rated those reasons 
less favorably than individuals who evaluated only affirming reasons for each of the five issues taken 
separately
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95 % CIs are for the mean difference. The outcome variable in all statistical 
tests was the average rated quality of reasons evaluated. Total n = 436
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 75 1.55 0.30 5.23*** [0.96, 2.13]
Animal testing 78 1.15 0.26 4.50*** [0.64, 1.66]
Drone strikes 87 1.80 0.27 6.66*** [1.26, 2.34]
Gold standard 121 1.08 0.20 5.52*** [0.69, 1.47]
Standardized testing 75 2.00 0.32 6.17*** [1.35, 2.65]
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computed with issue included as a random effect (random intercepts only) and with 
condition (affirming reasons only coded as 1 versus conflicting reasons only coded 
as 0) included as a binary fixed-factor. For the subset of participants who reported 
basing their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever, those who evaluated only 
conflicting reasons rated those reasons less favorably than participants who evalu-
ated only affirming reasons (n = 436, b = 1.49, SE = 0.12, t = 12.68, p < 0.001, 
95 % CI [1.26, 1.72]). Separate t-tests for each issue revealed that, for the subset of 
participants who reported basing their initial decisions on no reasons whatsoever, 
participants who evaluated only conflicting reasons rated those reasons less favora-
bly than participants who evaluated only affirming reasons for each of the five issues 
(see Table 8; Fig. D2).
Polarization Effects
Having found strong evidence for a prior-belief bias for all five issues, we next inves-
tigated whether participants who do not change their positions become more confident 
in the superiority of their positions after evaluating reasons (i.e., a polarization effect). 
To this end, for participants who evaluated reasons for both sides, we first computed a 
linear mixed-effects model with issue as a random effect (random intercepts only), and 
with rating period (before versus after evaluating reasons) serving as a binary fixed-
factor. Participants were more confident in their final decisions after evaluating reasons 
than they were before evaluating reasons (b = 0.36, SE = 0.04, t = 9.03, p < 0.001, 
95 % CI [0.28, 0.44]). Separate t-tests revealed that, for all issues except animal testing, 
participants were significantly more confident in their final decisions than in their initial 
Table 9  For participants who 
evaluated reasons for both 
sides, the results of separate 
t-tests for each issue indicate 
that participants were more 
confident in their final decisions 
than in their initial decisions for 
all issues except animal testing
*Indicates p < 0.05, **indicates p < 0.01, ***indicates p < 0.001. 
All 95 % CIs are for the mean difference. Total n = 915
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 176 0.46 0.10 4.53*** [0.26, 0.65]
Animal testing 181 0.12 0.08 1.50 [− 0.04, 0.27]
Drone strikes 193 0.19 0.08 2.34* [0.03, 0.34]
Gold standard 172 0.62 0.10 6.04*** [0.42, 0.82]
Standardized testing 193 0.44 0.08 5.46*** [0.28 0.60]
Table 10  For participants who 
evaluated affirming reasons 
only, the results of separate 
t-tests indicate that participants 
were more confident in their 
final decisions than in their 
initial decisions for all five 
issues taken separately
***Indicates p < 0.001. All 95  % CIs are for the mean difference. 
Total n = 983
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 198 0.93 0.10 9.75*** [0.75, 1.12]
Animal testing 193 0.43 0.08 5.60*** [0.28, 0.57]
Drone strikes 201 0.73 0.09 8.36*** [0.56, 0.90]
Gold standard 197 1.06 0.11 10.00*** [0.85, 1.26]
Standardized testing 194 0.51 0.08 6.50*** [0.36, 0.67]
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decisions (Table 9; Fig. E1). For all issues except drone strikes, we also obtained this 
same pattern of effects after statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge and 
the number of novel reasons evaluated (Table E1).
For participants who evaluated affirming reasons only, we computed a linear mixed-
effects model with issue as a random effect (random intercepts only), and with rating 
period (before versus after evaluating reasons) serving as a binary fixed-factor. Partici-
pants were more confident in their final decisions after evaluating reasons than they 
were before evaluating reasons (b = 0.73, SE = 0.04, t = 18.04, p < 0.001, 95 % CI 
[0.66, 0.81]). Separate t-tests revealed that, for all five issues, participants were signifi-
cantly more confident in their final decisions than in their initial decisions (Table 10; 
Fig. E1). We also obtained this same pattern of effects after statistically controlling for 
reported prior knowledge the number of novel reasons evaluated (Table E2).
For participants who evaluated conflicting reasons only, we computed a linear 
mixed-effects model with issue as a random effect (random intercepts only), and with 
rating period (before versus after evaluating reasons) serving as a binary fixed-factor. 
Overall, participants were less confident in their final decisions after evaluating reasons 
than they were before evaluating reasons (b = -0.11, SE = 0.04, t = − 2.88, p = 0.004, 
95 % CI [− 0.18, − 0.04]). Separate t-tests revealed that, for fracking and animal test-
ing only, participants were significantly less confident in their final decisions than in 
their initial decisions (Table 11; Fig. E1). There was not a significant change in confi-
dence ratings for drone strikes, the gold standard, or standardized testing (all p > 0.05). 
However, after statistically controlling for reported prior knowledge and the number of 
novel reasons evaluated, there were no significant effects of rating period on confidence 
for any issue (Table E3).
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to investigate the likelihood that individuals change 
their positions about diverse social and political issues when presented with reasons 
for or against their existing views, and to examine potential causes and consequences 
of resistance to position change. In doing so, we account for two problems that have 
Table 11  For participants who evaluated conflicting reasons only, the results of separate t-tests indicate 
that participants were less confident in their final decisions than in their initial decisions for fracking and 
animal testing only
*Indicates p < 0.05, **indicates p < 0.01, ***indicates p < 0.001. All 95 % CIs are for the mean differ-
ence. Total n = 810
Issue n Mdiff SEdiff t-statistic 95 % CI
Fracking 151 − 0.19 0.09 − 2.16* [− 0.37, − 0.02]
Animal testing 176 − 0.32 0.08 − 4.16*** [− 0.46, − 0.16]
Drone strikes 182 − 0.10 0.08 − 1.38 [− 0.25, − 0.05]
Gold standard 130 0.09 0.12 0.79 [− 0.14, 0.82]
Standardized testing 171 − 0.01 0.09 − 0.07 [− 0.18, 0.17]
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impeded progress in understanding whether and to what extent the prior-belief bias 
drives resistance to belief change: (1) a limited, narrow focus on a small set of well-
known, contentious issues and (2) a failure to account for deliberation over reasons 
and arguments in belief formation prior to experimental sessions. Our investigation 
yielded three main findings. First, participants were more likely to stick with their 
initial decisions for all five issues (fracking, animal testing, drone strikes, the gold 
standard, and standardized testing), regardless of which reasons they evaluated. 
Despite this general tendency to stick with their initial decisions, participants who 
evaluated conflicting reasons only were generally more likely to change their posi-
tions than those who evaluated reasons for both sides. And those who evaluated rea-
sons for both sides were generally more likely to change their positions than those 
who evaluated only affirming reasons. Second, for participants who did not change 
their minds—regardless of which set of reasons was evaluated—this resistance to 
position change was likely due to a motivated, biased evaluation of the reasons to 
support their initial decisions. That is, reasons favoring their initial chosen positions 
were rated as better than the reasons favoring the other, unchosen positions—regard-
less of reported prior knowledge about the issue, the number of novel reasons pre-
sented, or the reported strategy used in making the initial decision. Third, partici-
pants who did not change their positions tended to become more confident in the 
superiority of their positions after evaluating affirming reasons or reasons for both 
sides (a polarization effect), but not when evaluating opposing reasons.
Recent survey results have suggested that Americans are more ideologically 
divided than ever about social, political, and economic issues (Pew Research Center 
2016). Moreover, many people seem entrenched in their views and unwilling to 
change their minds in the face of strong, countervailing evidence (Flynn et al. 2017; 
Lewandowsky et  al. 2012). Our results show that, after considering many reasons 
challenging their initial chosen positions for diverse socio-political issues, people 
are more likely to stick with their initial decisions than to change them. With that 
being said, there is a more nuanced point to make regarding the propensity for posi-
tion change after considering reasons. Researchers have typically investigated the 
percentage of people overall who change their attitudes, beliefs, or opinions about 
socio-political issues after considering conflicting reasons only. However, it is 
informative to investigate the percentage of people who change their decisions after 
considering one set of reasons (e.g., conflicting reasons only) relative to those con-
sidering some other set of reasons (e.g., all reasons for both sides). In our study, 
although a relatively small percentage of participants changed their decisions no 
matter which reasons were evaluated, those who evaluated conflicting reasons only 
and reasons for both sides were more likely to change their decisions than those who 
evaluated affirming reasons only. And participants who evaluated conflicting rea-
sons only were about twice as likely, on average, to change their minds than partici-
pants who evaluated reasons for both sides. When the propensity for position change 
is considered within this context, people do seem responsive to reasons.
Moreover, our results suggest that those participants who did not change their 
minds after considering reasons tended to engage in a motivated, biased evalu-
ation of reasons to substantiate their initial decisions. Prior research has shown 
that—at least for highly contentious, emotionally-charged, and morally-laden 
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political issues—people evaluate reasons and arguments consistent with their 
existing beliefs as stronger than reasons and arguments incongruent with their 
existing beliefs (Taber et  al. 2009; Taber and Lodge 2009). However, because 
these studies did not account for prior knowledge, prior deliberation over these 
issues, or how participants reported having arrived at their initial judgments, 
it has been difficult to draw clear conclusions about resistance to belief change 
being caused by motivated, directional reasoning about new information. Our 
study provides strong, generalizable evidence for a prior-belief bias for socio-
political issues. Our results, moreover, suggest that even when some individual 
(1) reports knowing little or nothing about an issue, (2) has not previously consid-
ered many or any of the reasons and arguments we present, and (3) reports basing 
their initial decision on a feeling or intuition such that reasons played no role in 
arriving at the decision, it is likely that the individual will evaluate the reasons 
and arguments in a biased way to support the initially-chosen position.
One potential consequence of the prior-belief bias is an increase in confidence 
in the superiority of one’s views. After considering reasons for both sides, par-
ticipants who did not change their positions in our study became more confident 
in the superiority of their positions for four of the five socio-political issues. This 
finding is consistent with existing research identifying polarization effects after 
examining reasons for both sides of diverse issues, including: the death penalty 
(Lord et al. 1979), gun control (Taber and Lodge 2006), and university funding 
for unpopular groups (Taber et  al. 2009). Extending these findings to less con-
tentious, charged, well-known issues, we show that participants tend to become 
more confident in the superiority of their chosen positions even after account-
ing for reported prior knowledge and reason novelty. In contrast, for two of the 
five socio-political issues (the gold standard and drone strikes), participants who 
evaluated only conflicting reasons became less confident in their initial decisions, 
and these effects were rendered non-significant after statistically controlling for 
reported prior knowledge and reason novelty—although these effects were ren-
dered non-significant after controlling for reported prior knowledge and reason 
novelty. There were no issues for which participants became more confident in 
their initial decisions after considering conflicting reasons only. Several investi-
gations into the so-called “backfire” or “boomerang” effect have shown that exist-
ing beliefs are actually reinforced after exposure to countervailing reasons and 
arguments (Flynn et  al. 2017; Lewandowsky et  al. 2012). For instance, reasons 
and arguments meant to change existing beliefs about “death panels” under the 
Affordable Care Act, the presence of WMDs in Iraq, and the risks of vaccinations 
just strengthen those existing beliefs (Berinsky 2017; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; 
Nyhan et  al. 2013). However, a recent large-scale investigation of the backfire 
effect for 52 diverse contemporary social, political, and economic policy issues 
found little evidence that people become more entrenched in their existing beliefs 
after considering countervailing reasons and arguments (Wood and Porter 2018). 
In line with Wood and Porter (2018), our results suggest that when people are 
presented with conflicting reasons only, they either become less confident in their 
existing beliefs, or there is no change in confidence.
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Conclusions and Future Directions
Directional reasoning can lead to an uncompromising adherence to prior beliefs 
(Chong and Druckman 2010; Druckman 2012). Whether and to what extent indi-
viduals engage in biased, motivated reasoning to actively defend their existing views 
has important ramifications for the very possibility of a properly functioning democ-
racy. A central goal of our future research will be to develop and test strategies for 
eliminating the prior-belief bias. One possible way to make people more willing to 
change their positions and even-handedly evaluate evidence is to ensure that they do 
not explicitly state their positions from the outset. By explicitly choosing an initial 
position, participants might be more likely to defensively evaluate reasons and argu-
ments. And by changing their positions, they would be effectively admitting that 
they were wrong. If they do not have to potentially admit they were wrong, then 
they might be more open to even-handedly considering new reasons and arguments. 
By exploring strategies for eliminating the prior-belief bias as a driver of resistance 
to position change, it may be possible to bring about more sincere, fact-based, and 
open debate.
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